Michigan Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 5

1954

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE-POWER TO REDUCE GRADE
OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE IN ORDER TO AVOID JURY TRIAL
Chester F. Relyea S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Chester F. Relyea S.Ed., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE-POWER TO REDUCE GRADE OF CRIMINAL
OFFENSE IN ORDER TO AVOID JURY TRIAL, 52 MICH. L. REV. 746 (1954).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss5/10

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

746

MICHIGAN

LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 52

CRIMINAL OFFENSB IN ORDER TO Avom JURY TRIAL-A complaint was made in
the Municipal Court of Hoboken against the defendant charging that he had
willfully committed an assault and battery by spitting on another, in violation of the Disorderly Persons Law, which states: "Any person who commits
an assault or an assault and battery is a disorderly person."1 The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the statute violated his
constitutional right to prosecution by indictment and trial by jury. The
municipal court denied the motion. On certification to the New Jersey Su. preme Court, held, the statute did not wrongfully deny defendant a jury
trial. The statute refers only to simple assault and battery, which was punishable summarily at common law. Summary proceedings under the Disorderly
Persons Act, which has been in existence in some form since 1799 and which
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for many years has contained offenses indictable at common law and more
serious than assault and battery, has been challenged only once and then
unsuccessfully. This acquiescence is supported by analogy to the judicially
accepted practice of summary jurisdiction under municipal ordinances. State
11. Maier, (N.J. 1953) 99 A. (2d) 21.
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases, which is explicitly protected
by the constitutions of the United States and of every state, is generally held
not to extend to those offenses which were tried in summary proceedings at
common law at the time of the adoption of the federal or a state constitution2
or to new statutory offenses within this class of cases.3 The extensive use
made of summary proceedings both in England and in the American colonies
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been noted by numerous
writers,4 although the extent of this practice seems not to have been realized
by many judges and lawyers eager to protect the institution of trial by jury.I'
Persons accused of petty crimes,6 including most municipal offenses,7 are universally denied a right to jury trial in the United States. Although it is
usually difficult to ascertain precisely what offenses may be designated as
petty in any particular jurisdiction,8 the classification often includes viola2District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660 (1937); State v.
Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880); Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. St. 89 (1862); Wilentz v.
Galvin, 125 N.J.L. 455, 15 A. (2d) 903 (1940). Where a state has adopted successive
constitutions with substantially equivalent clauses protecting the right to trial by jury, there
is a problem as to whether reference may be made also to practice under the previous
constitutions. Compare State v. De Lorenzo, 81 N.J.L. 613 at 623, 79 A. 839 (1911), and
McCutcheon v. State Building Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 97 A. (2d) 663 (1953), with Town
of Montclair v. Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. 479, 79 A. (2d) 288 (1951).
3 District of Columbia v. Clawans, note 2 supra (dealing in second-hand personal
property without license); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (prohibition violation); Bd. of Health v. New York Central R. Co., IO N.J. 294, 90 A. (2d) 729 (1952)
(smoke ordinance violation); Crichton v. State, 115 Md. 423, 81 A. 36 (1911). Contra,
Van Swartow v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa. St. 131 (1854). Compare the two opinions in
Katz v. Eldredge, 97 N.J.L. 123, 117 A. 841 (1922).
4 See Frankfurter and Corcoran, "Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury," 39 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1926) (English and early American
practice); BURN, JuSTicB OF nm PBACB (1755) (English practice); State v. Glenn, note
2 supra; WEBB, ENcusH LocAL GoVERNMENT: THB PARISH AND THB CoaNTRY 418
(1924). Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra, at 930-933, cite cases of fines up to £500 and
imprisonment up to a year.
5 This appears from the tone of the decisions concerning summary jurisdiction, and
from the usually minor offenses and punishments involved in those cases.
6 Compare District of Columbia v. Clawans, note 2 supra (dealing in second-hand
property without license, punishable by fine up to $300 or 90 days, is a petty offense),
with District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 51 S.Ct. 52 (1930) (reckless driving and
speeding, punishable by fine up to $125 and 30 days is not a petty offense). See the
federal cases cited by Frankfurter and Corcoran, "Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury," 39 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1926).
7 See 9 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS §§27.32-27.39 (1950); 6 id., c. 23
(1950), and cases cited therein.
8 A few states have hard and fast rules. E.g., Ohio, where any offense involving
imprisonment or a fine above $50 is within the jury trial guarantee. Fremont v. Keating,
96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917); Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2945.17.
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tions of ordinances forbidding disorderly conduct,9 certain activities on Sunday,10 disturbing the peace,11 minor traffic violations,12 and other such offenses.
The determination of what is a petty offense is usually based in varying proportions on one or both of two considerations, viz., the extent of the penalty
and the nature of the offenses.18 The same considerations prevail where the
legislature reduces the grade of an offense to the status of a petty offense,
thereby denying the alleged offender the protection of a jury trial.14 As the
court in the principal case pointed out, there is evidence that at least in some
cases simple assault and battery was tried summarily before a justice of the
peace at common law.15 However, it is not certain that this procedure was
used very often in the case of assaults and batteries so severe as to require
punishment to the extent of $1,000 or one year in jail, or both, the penalty
under the statute in the principal case.16 It would seem that summary proceedings for relatively minor offenses, especially in congested centers of population,17 are necessary for the prompt and efficient administration of justice.
In these situations, attention should be directed toward ensuring the accused
a fair trial, and not toward guaranteeing him a trial by jury.

Chester F. Relyea, S.Ed.

9

Ex parte Schmidt, 24 S.C. 363 (1885); State v. Glenn, note 2 supra.

10 Goddard v. State, 12 Conn. 448 (1838).
11 Ex parte
1 2 Oshkosh

Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395 (1881).
v. Lloyd, 255 Wis. 601, 39 N.W. (2d) 772 (1949). Cf. District of
Columbia v. Colts, note 6 supra.
18 Considering both factors: District of Columbia v. Clawans, note 2 supra. Emphasizing nature of offense: District of Columbia v. Colts, note 6 supra; Latimer v. Wilson,
103 N.J.L. 159, 134 A. 750 (1926). Emphasizing punishment: People v. Kaminsky, 208
N.Y. 389, 102 N.E. 515 (1913).
14 See Commonwealth v. Wesley, 171 Pa. Super. 566, 91 A. (2d) 298 (1952)
(disorderly house); People v. Baird, 11 Hun. (N.Y.) 289 (1877) (cannot make unlawful sale of liquor disorderly conduct). Statutes reducing illegal acts of juveniles to misdemeanors or juvenile delinquency and calling for summary disposition in juvenile court
have caused courts trouble. See State v. Goldberg, 124 N.J.L. 272, 11 A. (2d) 299
(1940), affd. per curiam 125 N.J.L. 501, 17 A. (2d) 173 (1940) (reduction allowed as
to charge of carrying concealed weapons and assault with intent to kill); Ex parte Daniecki,
117 N.J. Eq. 527, 177 A. 91 (1935), affd. per curiam 119 N.J. Eq. 359, 183 A. 298
(1936) (not allowed as to charge of murder). Cf. People v. Kaminsky, 208 N.Y. 389,
102 N.E. 515 (1913).
15 Principal case at 25-29. See also People v. Justices, 74 N.Y. 406 (1878); PnoFFA'IT, TRIAL BY JtmY 136 (1877).
16 N.J. Sess. Laws (1951) tit. 2 A, §169-4.
17 In New York City all misdemeanors may be tried summarily in the Court of Special
Sessions. 66 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) part 3, p. 396, §31(1). A misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment for one year, a fine of $500, or both. 39 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §1937. This jurisdiction includes simple assault and
battery. 39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §§244, 245; People v. Rytel, 284 N.Y.
242, 30 N.E. (2d) 578 (1940).

